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REDUCING THE PREVALENCE
OF COCAINE AND HEROIN DEALING
AMONG ADOLESCENTS
MARK A.R. KLEIMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Drug abuse causes harm to users and others. That is the justification both
for the regulations, taxes, and prohibitions embodied in laws and for the array
of programs-enforcement, persuasion, and treatment-directed at reducing drug
abuse. The observation that illicit drugs as a group are less widely abused and
cause fewer fatalities than do their licit counterparts, alcohol and nicotine,
suggests that prohibition and its enforcement are effective to some extent.
But the public effort to control drug abuse creates its own problems,
especially in the form of the illicit markets that spring up around the prohibited
substances. Good policy design will attempt to minimize the total social damage
created by drug abuse, by the illicit markets, and by the drug control effort
itself.
One especially deleterious aspect of the illicit-market problem is the
widespread engagement in some neighborhoods of teenagers and young adults,
especially males, in the retail dealing of cocaine and heroin. This involvement
inflicts great damage on them and on their neighbors. Yet one who looked for
programs or policies explicitly designed to reduce the prevalence of such activity
would look largely in vain.
This Article will consider the possible value of mounting efforts to reduce
the prevalence of cocaine and heroin dealing among adolescents, explore the
forms such efforts might take, and propose a research program designed to
support the development and execution of a dealing-prevention effort. It is far
from certain that such efforts, in worthwhile form, can in fact be developed and
implemented. The purpose of this Article is to put the question of doing so on
the agenda for public discussion rather than to make a conclusive case for one
or another answer to that question.
. Professor of Policy Studies, University of California at Los Angeles. The author would like
to acknowledge substantial help received from Jonathan Caulkins, who read both an early sketch and
a full draft, and who provided many helpful comments and an even more helpful challenge to make
explicit why reducing the prevalence of dealing might be socially useful.
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II. THE PERSONAL AND SOCIAL COSTS OF ADOLESCENT DEALING
In addition to its effects on drug availability, retail cocaine and heroin
dealing activity by adolescents causes enormous collateral damage to the
communities within which it takes place and enormous direct damage to those
who engage in it. For short-term gains in money, excitement, and prestige,
youthful dealers risk imprisonment, death and injury in dealing-related violence,
and initiation to drug abuse. Neglect of schoolwork, the failure to acquire
legitimate-market work experience, and the acquisition of criminal records and
criminal social networks all tend to worsen longer-term life chances. The
oft-heard assertion that engaging in drug dealing constitutes a "rational"
response by adolescents in poor neighborhoods to unfavorable economic
conditions does not seem to be supportable unless one attributes to the
participants either absurdly high discount rates or very short time-horizons.
The structure of gains and losses to dealers-immediate, reliable, and
obvious rewards, with deferred, probabilistic, and obscure costs-is one likely
to produce less-than-rational responses. As Boyum has pointed out, the large
cash earnings in the illicit drug trades, balanced by the risks of injury or
criminal punishment, mean that virtually every illicit "firm" runs at an
accounting profit, even if its principals are taking losses in expected-utility
terms, once the risks they are running are factored in.1 As a consequence, the
illicit markets lack the discipline of bankruptcy that prevents licit enterprises
from operating at long-run deficits. The same logic applies to individual
employees of dealing enterprises: nothing guarantees that the prevailing wages
will fully remunerate them for the risks they run. There is, thus, an analogy
between drug-taking and illicit drug-dealing; in each case, immediate benefits
and deferred costs can easily betray individuals into acting voluntarily in ways
not in their long-term interests.
In addition to the costs dealing imposes on dealers, it also imposes costs on
those around them. The disorder that frequently accompanies open-air drug
markets is an enormous burden for the neighborhood. That fact helps explain
the demand from residents of heavily drug-impacted neighborhoods for the
police to "do something" about dealing activity.
The most spectacular negative impact of dealing by adolescents is its
contribution to deadly violence among them, both directly and through its impact
on the acquisition and carrying of firearms. As Professor Polsby points out, the
conditions of retail cocaine and heroin dealing in high-crime neighborhoods are
1. DAVID BOYUM, REFLECTIONS ON ECONOMIC THEORY AND DRUG ENFORCEMENT
(forthcoming 1997).
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such as to make a firearm a necessary tool of the trade.2 In addition, the ready
money to be made in the illicit drug markets provides the wherewithal for the
purchase of expensive guns; the days of zip-guns, or of cheap "Saturday Night
Specials," as the preferred weapons of adolescents in poor urban neighborhoods,
ended with the advent of the crack trade.3
Once a substantial number of adolescents in a neighborhood are heavily
armed, either out of the necessities of the drug trade or merely with
drug-derived earnings, others in those same neighborhoods have increased
incentive to be wellarmed themselves. The result can be a kind of many-player
"arms race." 4 Competitive escalation in weapons acquisition and carrying will
tend to increase the probability that confrontations remote from the drug
trade-arising from conflict over possessions, courtship activity, or all the
varieties of insults and slights comprehended under the term "dissing"
(expression of disrespect)-will lead to deadly violence.
If the appropriate measurements and comparisons could be made, the
aggregate damaged suffered by heroine and cocaine dealers, especially youthful
ones, might be seen to be as great as the aggregate damage suffered by the
larger number of cocaine and heroin abusers. That damage is much more
concentrated, and falls much more heavily on the poor and on ethnic minorities,
than the damage from drug use. In some neighborhoods the prevalence of
dealing related damage is extraordinarily high; of black men born in the District
of Columbia in 1967, approximately 1 % had been arrested for drug distribution
before the age of thirty.5
All of this damage applies with greatest force to the open retail markets,
whether open-air or in specialized "drug houses," selling cocaine (especially in
the form of crack) and heroin. The more discreet markets in which marijuana,
diverted prescription drugs, and the psychedelics are traded put youthful dealers
at much less risk from robbers, competitors, employers, and enforcement
authorities. While the suburban high school students who sell marijuana and
LSD to one another face significant risks of damage to their life chances, and
while persuading some of them not to do so would be useful in reducing the
availability of those drugs in suburban high schools, that persuasion effort would
not have much impact either on their life expectancies or on their chances of
2. Professor Daniel D. Polsby, Address at the Valparaiso University Law Review Conference
on Teenage Violence & Drug Use (Nov. 16, 1996).
3. David Kennedy et al., Youth Violence in Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders,
and a Use Reduction Strategy, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1996).
4. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 228-29 (1978).
5. PETER REUTER ET AL., MONEY FROM CRIME: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG
DEALING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 37-38 (1990).
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going to prison. Whether it would still be worthwhile to mount such an effort,
and how best to do so, are topics for another day.
III. APPROACHES TO REDUCING DEALING PREVALENCE
Purely as a logical matter, there would seem to be three possible
approaches to reducing the number of adolescents engaged in cocaine and heroin
dealing. One could reduce the opportunities for adolescents in those industries,
either by shrinking the total volumes of drugs sold or by inducing dealing
entrepreneurs to prefer adults to juveniles as employees. One could improve the
alternatives (real or perceived) to dealing. Or one could, even while leaving
opportunities and alternatives unchanged, persuade some adolescents not to
engage in dealing. Again, there is no a priori reason to believe that any of these
approaches is feasible, or worth the effort, especially in light of the risk that
reducing dealing by one individual or group will create opportunity for others.
But we will take them in order, and explore the prospects.
A. Reducing Opportunity
Reduced opportunities for adolescents in the cocaine and heroin trades could
result either from smaller markets or from markets with a smaller (relative) role
for young people. Both of these options should be considered further.
1. Shrinking the Markets
Two approaches seem to offer hope of shrinking the markets, and especially
the open street and drug-house scenes that disproportionately employ juveniles
and impose the greatest costs on the dealers and their neighborhoods. The two
approaches correspond, roughly, to two segments of the demand side of the drug
markets: on the one hand users without established "connections," many of them
occasional rather than deeply-committed drug users and many of them
suburbanites who drive into inner city areas to "score"; and on the other heavily
committed, often addicted, users with good connections, many of them
supporting their drug consumption by theft, prostitution, or dealing.
The suburban drive-throughs disproportionately depend on open street
markets, whose speed and anonymity appeal to them. Focused market-
disruption tactics, aimed at dealers, users, and the physical and social conditions
that support efficient retail dealing, have been shown to be capable of driving
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a wedge between such users and inner city dealing activity.6 This focused
crackdown approach is quite different in intent and execution from "street
sweeps" of users, dealers, and hangers-on and from the repetitive, undirected
use of "buy-and-bust" undercover operations. While sweeps and buy-busts are
designed to maximize the number of arrests and convictions, the goal of market
disruption is to minimize the number of completed transactions, using as little
enforcement capacity as possible in the process. Since much of the harm done
by dealing to dealers comes from enforcement, this is an important distinction
between market disruption and "sweeps." This approach will be relevant to
preventing juvenile dealing only to the extent the drive-through street markets
are important employers of juvenile dealers in a particular area; that extent is
likely to vary enormously from place to place, so no general statement can be
made about the value of market disruption efforts for this purpose.
Shrinking the volume of drug purchases by more committed users is best
accomplished by using some mix of coercion and treatment, directed individually
at the large proportion of high-volume users under criminal justice supervision
on bail, probation, or parole. Frequent testing and automatic sanctions,
supported as needed by treatment services, should be able to shrink substantially
the total volume of heroin and cocaine sold.7 Again, the relevance of this
approach to youthful drug dealing depends on the extent to which juveniles are
involved in selling to these steadier customers.
In either case, though, the gain in terms of reduced dealing by juveniles is
likely to constitute a relatively small proportion total value of successful efforts,
either at market disruption or at shrinking drug consumption by drug-involved
offenders. The case for such efforts is much broader than their impact on
juveniles. But it could still be true that such efforts are attractive when
compared to other approaches to reducing the prevalence of juvenile dealing.
2. Reducing the Role of Juveniles
For any given level of illicit-market activity, the proportion of labor
contributed by juveniles may vary. That suggests the other major approach to
shrinking opportunity: diminishing the relative importance of teenagers in the
dealing labor force. Thoughts about how to shrink the role of juveniles in
dealing ought to start with the simple question: Why is that role so great in the
6. See, e.g., DAVID M. KENNEDY, CLOSING THE MARKEr: CONTROLLING THE DRUG TRADE
IN TAMPA, FLORIDA (National Inst. of Justice Program Focus Series, 1993); DAVID M. KENNEDY,
FIGHTING THE DRUG TRADE IN LINK VALLEY (John F. Kennedy School of Government Case
Program C16-90-935.0, 1990).
7. Mark A.R. Kleiman, Coerced Abstinence: A Neo-Paternalist Drug Policy Initiative, in THE
NEW PATERNALISM (Lawrence M. Mead ed., forthcoming 1997).
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first place? Why will drug dealers hire people that McDonald's would not
touch, often trusting them with cash or valuable drug inventories?
The answer is largely that current laws and enforcement practices have
created artificial advantages for juveniles in competing for drug-dealing jobs.
Because they are tried and punished as juveniles, they face much smaller risks
of punishment than their older neighbors, and are thus presumably willing to
take lower wages. Perhaps equally significantly, because they are not at risk of
severe imprisonment, juvenile employees of dealing organizations who are
arrested are not subject to the pressures their adult counterparts face to
"cooperate" with the police in making cases against their associates. Thus, a
youthful associate is not only cheaper to hire, he (rarely she) is safer, in terms
of the risk of prison. In addition, adolescents may be systematically less afraid
of physical risk than adults and thus less deterred by the violence of the street
drug trades. This point suggests that reducing the level of violence would tend
to shift the age mix of the dealing labor force. Since both the level and the style
of enforcement activity can influence the level of violence within the traffic, this
factor ought to be taken into account in enforcement planning. The longer the
terms imposed on adults, the greater the advantage of hiring juveniles.' Longer
adult sentences create this effect in three distinct ways: by increasing the wage
gap; by increasing the risk that an adult confederate will inform; and by
increasing the consequence of being informed upon.
One attempt to create a countervailing pressure, enhanced sentencing for
the use of a minor as an accomplice, is now a feature of federal law and of
many state laws as well. But in the federal code especially, the very high base
sentences based purely on dealing volume tend to diminish the significance of
the "use-a-kid" enhancement. While the "school-zone" enhancement is often
charged, because it is so easy to prove, the "use-a-kid" enhancement requires
so much additional prosecutorial work, for relatively so little additional time,
that it has rarely been employed.
Moving away from a primarily quantity-based sentencing structure and
toward one based more on the details of dealing conduct (such as use of violence
or employment of minors) is attractive on many grounds, and is probably
essential to any serious attempt to shrink the employment opportunities that the
illicit markets offer to poor adolescents. But any such move would face
opposition from prosecutors, who value both the relative simplicity of proving
8. It may be the case that one effect of the "Rockefeller laws" that increased penalties for retail
drug dealing in New York in the mid-1960s was to spur the employment of juveniles in what had
previously been a largely adult industry.
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quantity rather than conduct and the bargaining leverage created by long
mandatory or guideline-based sentences over which prosecutors, rather than
judges, have discretion.
B. Improving Alternatives to Dealing
Even if the opportunities provided by dealing were to remain unchanged,
the number of adolescents who take up those opportunities would tend to decline
if alternatives to dealing-other means to achieve the same ends, or other uses
of the same resources, especially time-became, or were perceived as, more
attractive than they now are. Dealing provides money, social status and
function, excitement, and access to drugs. It also absorbs time, which may
appear as a cost if there is something else of value to do with that time or as a
benefit if time hangs heavy and needs to be filled to avoid boredom.
One alternative source of money and social status and function is licit work.
Insofar as licit jobs, or the careers of which the form parts, are valued, and put
at risk in case of arrest and conviction, licit employment also increases the
effective cost of dealing activity. Thus, improving licit employment prospects
ought, other things equal, to reduce dealing activity.' So should increasing licit
wages. There would presumably be some tendency for dealing wages to rise if
the illicit labor supply fell, but the net result would still be to make adolescents
less competitive with adults for drug-dealing jobs.
Improving job prospects for poor urban teenagers has received considerable
attention, both from the viewpoint of encouraging employers to hire them and
from the viewpoint of changing the teenagers' mix of skills and attitudes to make
them more "employable." Less has been written and done about changing the
social status accorded to entry-level employment among those who seek it and
those whose opinions they value. One would like to create a situation where
teenage boys in drug-impacted neighborhoods would prefer to have their
girlfriends see them working at McDonald's to having their girlfriends seeing
them dealing rock. But surely the endless repetition of the mantra "dead-end
jobs flipping burgers" by those who hope for political action to change job
opportunities cannot fail to have some negative impact on the eagerness with
which the existing opportunities are grasped. By the same token, it is easy to
imagine changes that employers could make-for example, with respect to how
their employees are required to dress-that would make the jobs seem less
demeaning.
9. But cf. REUTER Er AL., supra note 5, at 62-77 (displaying evidence that dealing can easily
co-exist with even relatively well-paid licit jobs).
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All that said, it seems implausible that anything we are likely to do with
respect to youth employment will have a major impact on dealing. Perhaps we
should regard any such impact as a fortunate side-effect of policies which
deserve pursuit for other reasons, rather than as something that could provide
a primary justification for such policies.
The same is probably true of making schools more interesting (and safer)
places to be. Doing so might reduce somewhat the supply of drug-dealing labor
among adolescents, directly by decreasing the drop-out rate and thus the number
of adolescents with time on their hands and indirectly by increasing the effective
cost of arrest (since arrest is likely to interfere with schooling). But that benefit
would be lost somewhere in the rounding error in estimating the total benefit of
improving the schools. The impact on youth dealing of changing youth culture
in ways that created less demand for display of wealth in the form of clothing
and jewelry would be more direct, but ideas about how to do so seem to be
quite scarce. (An exception is the much-mocked movement toward school
uniforms, which can be enormous money-savers compared to following juvenile
fashion trends.) On the other hand, directly competing with drug dealing for the
time of potential dealers, especially at peak dealing hours, may offer some real
hope. That was one of the ideas behind evening youth sports leagues, an idea
that went from being praised for political ends to being vilified for other political
ends. It is possible that "midnight basketball" was not a good idea in the first
place, or that only very well-designed (and possibly expensive) implementations
have any value, but surely it is worth finding out.
C. Persuasion
Considerable effort is expended to prevent potential drug abuse by
persuading potential drug users, especially teenagers, not to start using. Both
mass media messages and in-school "drug education" efforts are directed at this
end, though with mixed results. 0 Yet no comparable effort is directed towards
persuading potential dealers in illicit drugs, again especially teenagers, not to
start dealing."
10. See, e.g., J. H. Brown & M. D'Emidio-Caston, On Becoming At Risk Through Drug
Education: How Symbolic Policies and Their Practices Affect Students, 19 EvALUATION REv. 451
(1995); Phyllis Ellickson & Robert M. Bell, Drug Prevention in Junior High: A Multi-Site
Longitudinal Test, 24 SCIENCE 1299 (1990); Mary Ann Pentz et al., A Multicommunity Trial for
Primary Prevention ofAdolescentDrug Abuse, 261 JAMA 3259 (1989); J. MICHAEL POLICH ET AL.,
STRATEGIES FOR CONTROLLING ADOLESCENT DRUG ABUSE (1984); Nancy Tobler et al., How
Effective Is Drug Abuse Resistance Education? A Meta-Analysis of Project DARE Outcome
Evaluations, 9 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1394 (1994).
11. "Gang resistance" programs are a partial exception.
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No one doubts that behavior depends on attitudes and opinions as well as
external circumstances. But application of that truism to policy is curiously
uneven. In the area of drug abuse control, change of attitude as a goal and
persuasion as a tool have been limited largely to the "demand side" of the
market-that is, to actual and potential users. So has service delivery, in the
form of drug treatment. By contrast, most of the coercive effort has been
directed to dealers, the "supply side." Yet there is no apparent reason to expect
that dealers in general are any more deterrable or less persuadable (or for that
matter less in need of or capable of benefiting from, and having their behavior
improved by services) than users. The neglect of persuasion efforts on the
supply side of the illicit markets, and in crime-control policy generally, is quite
striking, given the importance of deterrence as a justification for enforcement
and punishment and the obvious reality that deterrent effects depend on the
beliefs of those whom they are intended to deter.
The absence of anti-dealing persuasion efforts, in the presence of fairly
intense anti-drug-abuse persuasion efforts, may help explain what otherwise
seems an inexplicable pattern of attitudes: drug dealing is less disapproved of
than drug using among some demographic groups in some neighborhoods. 2
Even if our sole concern were for the welfare of the juveniles involved, it would
seem odd to restrict drug prevention efforts to the demand side of the drug
markets in those neighborhoods where dealing is widespread. Participation in
dealing has been shown to be a risk factor for initiation of drug abuse and for
progression to more dangerous drugs.13 Many young dealers start off not using
drugs but eventually begin using drugs after becoming dealers in the illicit drug
markets. Given the evidence that personal disapproval of drug use, and
perceived disapproval of drug use among peers, constitute important protective
factors in drug-taking, it is plausible that low levels of disapproval constitute a
risk factor for dealing.
Breaking the link that binds persuasion to the demand side only would allow
us to consider what means of persuasion might be useful in changing the
attitudes and opinions of actual and potential juvenile participants in drug
dealing. Persuasion efforts can be characterized by their targets-the
populations on which they are designed to work and the attitudes and opinions
sought to be changed-by their messages, and by their means of transmission
(mass media, direct communication, indirect communication through reference
groups and opinion leaders).
12. TERRY M. WILLIAMS, THE COCAINE KIDS: THE INSIDE STORY OF A TEENAGE DRUG RING
10 (1989).
13. RICHARD R. CLAYTON & HARWIN L. Voss, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, YOUNG MEN AND DRUGS IN MANHATTAN: A CASUAL ANALYSIS 129-56 (1981).
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If we examine persuasion efforts directed at reducing drug abuse, we see
primarily a mix of mass-media efforts and school-based efforts at direct
communication. Less attention has been paid to the possibility of mobilizing
adults other than teachers whose views teenagers might care about-their
parents, physicians, coaches, clergy, social workers, scout leaders, et cetera-as
indirect carriers of appropriately-designed messages, though it may well be the
case that informal efforts in this regard are doing much of the real work of drug
abuse prevention. Only a little more attention has been given to patterns of
opinion leadership among adolescents and the differential importance of
changing the minds of opinion leaders and encouraging them to speak out in the
desired direction. Indirect communication constitutes much of the content of the
"community mobilization" approach that seems to greatly enhance the effective-
ness of school-based and media-based approaches. 4 Designing appropriate
messages for intermediates to carry, and providing the appropriate training and
incentives, represent formidable challenges.
All of these persuasion efforts are characterized by incentive problems
among those who organize them and carry them out. While the persuasion
effort around product marketing is relatively straightforward to evaluate, with
substantial financial rewards for successful practitioners, the anti-drug-abuse
persuasion effort is less measurable in its effects and has much weaker links
between success and rewards. Much of the effort consists of volunteers, and the
financial support comes either from contributions or from the allocation of
public funds. This situation gives competitive advantage to targets, means, and
especially messages that provide symbolic satisfaction to their organizers and
supporters, rather than those that make the greatest positive impact on their
intended audiences. Consequently, knowledge of what works in anti-drug
persuasion is limited, and has only limited effects on decision-making when it
competes with symbolic values; the controversy over the D.A.R.E. program
provides one illustration, and the almost complete absence of messages directed
at current drug users (rather than potential drug users, or the families and
employers of current drug users) provides another. To be sure, the
methodological problems of prevention research would be daunting ones even
if the motivation to doing it and acting on it were stronger than they are.
Adolescents who might become cocaine and heroin dealers resemble the
adults who make drug policy even less than do adolescents who might become
problem drug users. The messages optimally designed to appeal to them would
therefore in all probability be even further from those which would best please
antidrug leaders than is the case for persuasion efforts on the demand side.
14. PHYLLIS L. ELLICKSON & ROBERT M. BELL, PROSPECTS FOR PREVENTING DRUG USE
AMONG YOUNG ADOLESCENTS 5-12 (1990).
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Thus, one would expect that if anti-dealing persuasion efforts were to be
mounted, they would diverge even more sharply from optimality than
anti-drug-abuse persuasion efforts.
Conceptually, the design of any persuasion campaign ought to involve the
following steps: identifying the target population; learning about their existing
behavior, attitudes, and opinions; identifying which sets of attitudes and opinions
influence, positively or negatively, undesired behavior patterns; isolating those
key attitudes and opinions that could be moved in the desired direction; choosing
messages and means of delivery; pilot testing and fine-tuning; implementation;
and ongoing monitoring and correction.
For example, it might turn out that juveniles who engage in cocaine and
heroin dealing are strongly motivated by money, that their estimates of the
amounts of money to be made are significantly inflated, that those estimates
could be changed by some mix of messages, and that changing those estimates
would change dealing behavior. Or it might turn out that one of these steps
does not work (their estimates are correct; their estimates are inflated but hard
to deflate; or better information, even if believed, would influence behavior only
negligibly) but that working on estimates of risk, or on beliefs about the damage
dealing does to neighborhoods, would be more powerful. There are no abstract
grounds for judging in advance, and the answers may differ from place to place
and time to time. That suggests the need for a research program as a
preliminary to a persuasion campaign. 5
One approach that might yield fruit would be an indirect persuasion effort
aimed at changing the (non-enforcement) social contingencies around dealing
activity by changing the expressed attitudes of those whose good opinion teenage
dealers value: adults; peers; and potential dating partners. Again, any such
approach would require first an effort to determine whose opinions young
dealers care about and then what the current opinions of those groups are and
how, and how often and vigorously, they are expressed.
IV. WHY PREVALENCE MATTERS
Retail-level cocaine and heroin dealing are often characterized by large
numbers of sellers working part-time, apparently willing to expand their hours
if the opportunity to do so arises. This helps explain why the crack trade, for
example, has been able to survive, seemingly unimpaired, despite very
substantial increases in the arrest and imprisonment of dealers. Under-employed
dealers constitute a "reserve army" of dealing labor, so that no labor shortage
15. See infra part V.
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results when more dealers are imprisoned. The same, presumably, would be
true if efforts at persuasion reduced the number of adolescents prepared to work
in the illicit drug trade; they would be replaced, and the life of the illicit
industry would go on, and the effective availability of the drugs in question
would not measurably change. That analysis raises the question of whether any
socially useful purpose would be served by .such persuasion efforts.
Some of the costs of drug dealing to dealers and others depend only on the
total volume of dealing activity and not at all on the number of persons engaging
in dealing. The disorder surrounding the street markets would probably be no
less if half as many dealers worked twice as many hours each. The same may
be true of the violence related directly to the trade: robberies, turf disputes, and
"enforcement" actions by dealing organizations against employees. Surely, the
impact of dealing on availability and thus on consumption depends on the
number of hours worked rather than the number of individuals who work them.
But other costs relate to the number of dealers-the prevalence of dealing
in the population at risk-rather than the volume of activity. A small number
of hours of dealing will create sufficient incentive, and provide sufficient cash,
to acquire a gun. More hours for an individual may not necessarily lead to
additional guns, and in any case one is sufficient. So reducing the number of
dealers, even keeping total dealing hours and earnings constant, will tend to
reduce the number of guns, and thus the level of deadly violence. Similarly, the
number of convictions for dealing is largely a function of the level of dealing
activity and the level of enforcement effort, and a relatively small level of
dealing activity by any individual will produce a substantial likelihood of a
conviction. But much of the damage to future licit opportunities is done by the
first felony conviction as an adult; halving the number of persons convicted,
leaving the number of convictions unchanged, would lead to less total loss of
"human capital." Thus, persuasion efforts directed at those already convicted
once might, by creating increased opportunities for novices, have a perverse net
effect. 16
V. THE NEED FOR RESEARCH
Given the prevention of drug dealing as a policy goal, a useful first step
would be to mount some research into the current attitudes of young people in
drug-impacted neighborhoods, and of their neighbors, about dealing and dealers,
to supplement the existing journalistic and ethnographic accounts. One source
of weakness in existing drug abuse prevention efforts has been the
under-investment in what might be thought of as "market research." Given the
rapid changes and geographic variations both in youth culture and in the
16. I owe this point to Jonathan Caulkins.
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functioning of the drug markets, such studies need to be done at many sites and
repeated frequently. Some of the questions to be addressed might include:
(1) What is the prevalence of dealing activity observed in a few target
neighborhoods? How does it vary by age, birth cohort, and gender?
What proportion of those who enter dealing activity remain as casual
dealers, move on to more intensive activity, or quit? What proportion
of those beginning dealing are naive to the use of the drug they sell?
What is their initiation rate to the use of that drug, and what
proportion of them progress to heavy use? We can hope to find only
tentative and somewhat impressionistic answers to such questions in a
preliminary study.
(2) How is dealing-derived income spent? How much of it is saved or
given to others? What is the impact of this income flow on social
relationships (e.g., between parents and their dealing-involved children
who may be helping with the rent)?
(3) What are the actual results, and especially risks, of dealing as
experienced by a representative population of dealers? What are the
conditional probabilities of death, injury, incarceration, and addiction
at different levels of dealing activity?
(4) Whose opinions do dealers and potential dealers value? What do they
now believe to be the attitudes of those key reference groups toward
dealing activity?
(5) What are the attitudes of residents of the neighborhoods observed
about dealing and dealers? How do they stratify by age, gender, and
socioeconomic status? What is the content of the negative attitudes?
How are they expressed? What are the correlates of speaking out
strongly?
(6) What are the attitudinal correlates of dealing: both personal attitudes
and perceptions of the attitudes of others? To what extent do those
attitudes pre-exist dealing activity itself, rather than being the result of
engaging in dealing?
(7) How malleable are the attitudes involved? Are there major gaps
between perceptions and verifiable facts that a prevention program
could exploit? Examples might include earnings potential,
enforcement and injury risk, addiction risk, and actual attitudes of
important reference groups such as potential dating partners.
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(8) To what communications channels do actual and potential dealers pay
attention? Which might be credible carriers of the relevant messages?
With such a research base in hand, one could then proceed to the rest
of the development and implementation tasks: design; pilot testing,
evaluation, and correction; full-scale roll-out; and ongoing monitoring
and modification.
Even with knowledge and resources, it is far from certain that anything
very impressive could be done about dealing behavior as long as the level of
illicit-market revenues remains as high as it now is. But the prevention of
dealing would seem to deserve more attention than it currently receives.
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